NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
It is believed that a substantial proportion of individuals entitled to receive means-tested welfare benefits do not claim them, thus reducing the effectiveness of government programmes designed to reduce poverty. Existing qualitative research on welfare participation emphasises claim costs arising from the difficulty and hassle of making a claim and other intangible costs such as distaste for welfare participation and social stigma associated with dependence on benefits. In Britain, non-take-up is particularly serious for pensioners. Official estimates report that, although approximately 2 million pensioners were living in low income households in 2000-01, between a third and a quarter of them did not claim the Income Support / Minimum Income Guarantee payments to which they were entitled One of the most serious difficulties faced by researchers in trying to understand non-take-up behaviour is that we cannot observe directly the level of entitlement that a person would be judged to have if they were to apply for benefit. Researchers attempt to overcome this problem by using household survey data giving details of the income, assets and other circumstances of representative individuals, then to use the known rules of the benefit system to simulate the entitlement that would result from a successful claim. However, this simulation process is imperfect because individuals' responses to survey questions may be subject to reporting error.
The existence of measurement error in income and simulated benefit entitlement causes systematic distortion of the results produced by statistical analysis of take-up behaviour. Moreover, this bias is technically very complicated and difficult to remove. We point out a technical flaw in previous influential analyses of benefit take-up in the presence of measurement error and indicate how it can be corrected.
Introduction
Means-testing is an obvious way of focusing welfare spending on those most in need and limiting the burden on public finances. The drawback of means-testing is that people who are entitled to receive welfare benefit may not come forward to claim it and there is evidence from several countries that non-participation in welfare programmes is widespread. This issue has seen much applied research; studies by Ashenfelter (1983) , Moffitt (1983) , Blundell, Fry and Walker (1988) , Duclos (1995) , Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Hernandez et. al. (2006) use a static discrete choice approach, whilst Blank and Ruggles (1996) and Anderson and Meyer (1997) estimate dynamic models of movement in and out of welfare participation.
One of the main difficulties facing applied researchers is that welfare eligibility is not directly observable but must be inferred from survey evidence on household incomes and other relevant characteristics. This leaves open the possibility that some apparent non-participation is due to measurement error. Because of under-reporting of income or other survey errors, households which appear not to be claiming the welfare benefits to which they appear entitled may in fact not be entitled at all. There has been much recent interest in measurement error problems (see Carroll et. al., 1995 , for a survey); however, surprisingly few studies of welfare programme participation have addressed this issue in depth. Notable exceptions include Bollinger and David (1997) who use an external validation sample as direct evidence on measurement error in benefit receipt and Duclos (1995) who estimates a complex structural model of participation in the UK Supplementary Benefit (SB) programme. Duclos' study has been influential because it remains the only model to allow formally for the possibility that assessments of entitlement made by programme administrators and econometric analysts are both subject to error. There is much external evidence to suggest that survey evidence is prone to error (see, for example, Rodgers et. al., 1993; Hancock and Barker, 2002) . Consistent with this, Duclos' central finding is that measurement error cannot be ignored if welfare participation behaviour is to be properly understood. Whilst allowing for measurement error, Duclos estimates an econometric model which has important policy implications: notably very high levels of implicit claim costs or social stigma for some groups of potential claimants. Our purpose is to point out a technical flaw in the maximum likelihood measurement error (MLME) approach adopted by Duclos and to apply a corrected MLME estimator to an illustrative benefit takeup model for more recent British welfare participation data. Like Duclos, we find that measurement error has an important impact on the results but, unlike Duclos, we find that correcting for measurement error reduces the estimated size of claim costs incurred by claimants.
The Duclos model and ML estimation
In general terms, Duclos' (1995) model is as follows. 1 The Supplementary Benefit (SB) system involves a payment to bring the net income of the benefit unit up to a guaranteed minimum. Write the difference between the guaranteed minimum and original income, as assessed by programme administrators, as B g . Entitlement to SB is equal to B g . when positive, otherwise to zero. Assessment errors are assumed to take the conventional random measurement error form:
where B a is the analyst's simulation of entitlement, based on household survey information. Conditional on B g , ε a is a N(µ a , σ 2 a ) variate. A vector X contains all the exogenous variables describing the benefit unit and its financial circumstances. Observed receipt and non-receipt of SB are indicated by the events R = 1 and R = 0. Without going into detail, there is a rational choice assumption (Duclos' equation (16)) which allows the derivation of an explicit form for the conditional participation probability:
However, the government administrator's assessment B g is not observed, so the probability structure (2) cannot be fitted directly to observed data. Duclos' procedure is to write B g = B a − ε a and then integrate out the unobservable ε a :
However, this assumes that ε a ∼ N(µ a , σ 2 a ) conditional on X and (implicitly) on B a . This requires ε a and B a to be statistically independent conditional on X, which is the source of the difficulty. In fact, assumption (1) implies that B a and ε a are independent only if corr(B a , B g ) 2 = var(B a )/var(B g ). This is only sure to be satisfied in the extreme case of perfect measurement. It can never be satisfied if var(B a ) > var(B g ) which would occur under the standard assumption that the measurement error ε a is independent of the 'true' variable B g .
What would be required for a correct maximum likelihood treatment of Duclos' model? If we condition on X but not on the observed B a , the likelihood function is based on the following participation probability:
where f is the normal density of (B a |B g ) and F (B g |X) is the distribution function of the unobservable official entitlement B g , conditional on all relevant observed characteristics. As a (less efficient) alternative to (4), we might use a conditional likelihood, based on the participation probability conditional on X and B a :
The important point here is that either approach to likelihood construction requires an explicit assumption about the distribution F (B g |X), which Duclos' model does not provide. The function maximised by Duclos' estimator is generally not a correct likelihood function. Consequently, his results should be used with caution.
A further critical issue in this area is identification. Secure identification of measurement error models requires further information, such as repeated measures of the underlying 'true' variables (see Carroll et. al., 1995) . The Duclos model uses only a simulated value for entitlement to benefit, B a , and a binary indicator, R, of whether benefit is actually received. No use is made of the survey response on the amount of benefit received by claimants, despite the fact that this would be valuable identifying information. Duclos' model also does not consider the source of measurement error in simulated entitlement and the possibility that there is common error in the survey measures of pre-welfare income and assets and the simulated entitlement calculated from them. If the source of measurement error in B a is error in the survey measures of income and assets, then the assumption (1) cannot be satisfied because of the complex nonlinear nature of the benefit rules.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider the example of pensioners' participation in the British Income Support programme, making explicit allowance for the transmission of errors in directly observed income and assets to simulated entitlement. We use a repeated measures approach, making use of recorded benefit receipts in addition to recorded income and three indicators of asset levels. Despite the complexity of MLME, estimation proves feasible and informative.
The welfare system for pensioners in Britain
In our data period, 1997-2000, the principal means-tested benefit available to lowincome pensioners was Income Support (IS). Like the earlier SB system analysed by Duclos, the aim of IS is to bring the income of recipients up to a guaranteed minimum level, depending on age, disability and whether single or living as a couple (see Hernandez et. al. 2006 for details). A pensioner household with assessed income below the IS level receives the difference between their income and the guaranteed minimum, provided their asset holdings are below £8,000. The definition of income used for this calculation ignores actual investment income but includes a notional income related to asset holdings between £3,000 and £8,000.
Algebraically, the system works as follows. Let the applicable guaranteed minimum standard be M, which depends only on age and the size of the pensioner unit. K 1 = £3,000 and K 2 = £8,000 are the asset thresholds and τ = 1/250 is the conversion rate for converting assets into notional investment income. C is the household's total financial assets; P is the component of original income which can be assumed to be measured without error; Y is all other assessable income. In the application reported below P is defined to include receipts from the basic state pension which generates standard amounts for most recipients and which are normally accurately observed. Y includes receipts of occupational and private pensions which are extremely variable and relate to past earnings and pension contributions. C and Y are non-negative, since deficits and debts are ignored for the purposes of determining eligibility. Let b(C, Y ) represent the rules of the IS system which determines official eligibility, B g , where the dependence on P and M is left implicit. Then:
This can be partially inverted to give:
Further details of the IS system are given in Appendix 1.
The Family Resources Survey

Data selection and preparation
We use the Family Resources Survey (FRS), a continuous cross-sectional survey of British households carried out on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) during April 1997 to March 2000. In principle, the FRS gives all information necessary to assess each respondent's entitlement and establish whether they are receiving IS. Although we allow for measurement error, it is important to eliminate data errors as far as possible. We applied the following process of error detection and correction before using the data (and before making the sample deletions listed below). The first step was to reverse data edits and imputations made by DWP, affecting benefit receipts, private pension income and capital holdings. This was done because we detected some inconsistencies in edits to benefit data and because some of the imputation procedures (such as substitution of sample means for missing values) are inappropriate for our purposes. The next stage involved detecting inconsistencies in benefit data and reconciling them where possible. Potential errors in recorded receipts of social security benefits are generally easier to identify than errors in other sources of income or in capital because specified benefit rates and eligibility rules allow consistency checks to be made. Missing values for benefit receipt were imputed where a correct value could be identified unambiguously. For example, some pensioners in the FRS are able to supply a breakdown of their state pension payments which helps to disentangle different benefits received as one combined payment. In other cases it is clear that a payment of IS is included in their pension payment and there is double counting if a separate amount of IS is also recorded. Where it was not possible to correct an inconsistency or to impute a missing value on any reliable basis, the value was left missing. This was true for all missing values for private pension and capital holdings where there is no reliable way to impute an individual-specific value. Full details of this data cleaning process can be found in Hancock and Barker (2005) . In addition, cases in which investment income had been imputed were also identified and substituted by missing values. There were 15,890 potential pensioner units in the FRS sample, defined as single people at least 5 years over state retirement age (60 for women and 65 for men) or couples where either partner is 5 years above retirement age. We focus on older pensioners for several reasons: they are a group with a high poverty rate; they have very little labour market involvement to complicate the welfare participation issue; and, having been retired for a relatively long time, their adjustment to post-retirement circumstances is likely to be complete. This is in contrast with the dynamic modeling issues faced by Blank and Rutter (1996) and Anderson and Meyer (1997) . The subsample used for this analysis contains 6,010 benefit units after deleting households which: contained multiple benefit units (2,211); were still re-paying a mortgage (448); received allowances from an absent spouse (11); had employment or self-employment income (419); were certain to be ineligible under our assumptions because state pension income P was above the guaranteed minimum M (5,313); did not respond to survey questions on a core variable such as recorded IS receipt, pension or non-assessable income (1,189); or had recorded benefit higher than the difference between the guaranteed minimum and their non means-tested benefit income (289). These deletions are less serious than they might at first appear. Most (5,313) are simple exclusions of pensioners known to be non-entitled, for whom participation is not an issue. Simulations suggest that virtually all of the 419 pensioners with earnings would be ineligible for IS either with or without their earnings and thus are of no interest to us; only 88 of the 448 mortgagors appear possibly entitled to IS, and we exclude them because of the large measurement problems associated with the calculation of mortgage interest. The last group of 289 deletions was made to exclude cases where there were strong grounds to believe that recorded IS receipt was in error. The most serious of the deletions is likely to be the set of 1,189 cases lost through item non-response (although note that many of these may be IS-ineligible and thus of no interest anyway). We assume that this form of non-response is ignorable. Given the careful data cleaning and sample selection, we believe it is reasonable to assume that the major remaining source of measurement error lies in the survey measurement of assets and private income and it is this source of measurement error that we focus on. We do not exclude any cases because of missing or possibly erroneous responses on private income and assets. Summary statistics for the sample used for estimation of the model are given in Appendix 1.
Assets and income in the FRS
Each adult in the pensioner unit is asked whether he or she receives any state benefit. If in receipt of IS, they are asked follow up questions on the last amount received and how the benefit is paid. Throughout this process, pensioners are encouraged by the interviewer to find and consult documentary evidence such as an order book, a letter from the Benefits Agency or a bank statement. This ensures that the information on benefit receipt is as reliable as possible; in the subsequent analysis, we assume that benefit receipt is accurately recorded in the final dataset.
The FRS questions dealing with asset holdings proceed as follows. Firstly, each respondent is asked whether they have had in the last 12 months a current account or a savings account. If the answer is affirmative they are asked whether they have each of a comprehensive range of these accounts and different types of financial assets. Respondents with any accounts are asked to assign their estimate of the current value of their assets to one of several intervals. Secondly, detailed information about the current values of each of the assets held is collected, provided the initial estimate of total assets was between £1,500 and £20,000. These are aggregated over respondents within the unit and over asset types to give a single capital figure. Item non-response means that these observations for total capital are often not available. Measurement error is likely to be significant even when total capital is observed. In addition to assets, respondents are also asked about investment income. For each one of their asset holdings, they give an estimate of the interest or dividend received in the last 12 months. These are aggregated over all holdings and members of the benefit unit to give total investment income.
Each respondent is asked whether they receive a state pension, with encouragement to consult any relevant documentation to provide the most recent amount received. The FRS also includes questions about occupational and private pensions and any other sources of income. However, not all types of income are included in the calculation of IS entitlement; in particular, non-means-tested disability benefits are excluded from assessable income. In the analysis we assume that the state pension and income excluded from assessable income are accurately observed. All other income types (mainly private and occupational pensions) are subject to error.
The model
We use a simple binary response model of welfare participation. One of the core explanatory factors is the amount of benefit entitlement, which cannot be observed directly, but can be simulated by applying the known rules of the benefit system to given levels of income and assets. In the absence of measurement error, probit analysis is applied to the subset of cases with positive simulated entitlement. Since the benefit rules are non-smooth, nonlinear functions of income and assets, the impact of measurement error in income and assets is complex. Moreover, since welfare participation is only possible for those with strictly positive entitlement, measurement errors in income and asset holdings can cause zero entitlement to be wrongly simulated as positive and vice versa, generating error in sample selection. Our model differs from that of Duclos (1995) , who assumes additive errors in simulated entitlement rather than error in the income and asset variables which are inputs to the entitlement calculation. Like Duclos, we use a MLME approach, since alternative IV estimators have little advantage in terms of simplicity in this case. 2 To implement MLME, we specify a model for the unobserved income and asset variables that underpin IS entitlement. These are defined as the values that are, or would be, reported to IS programme administrators when a claim is made. 2 If there are (say) additive measurement errors in income and assets, they become complicated non-additive errors in simulated entitlement. Let measured assets and income be C * and Y * and let Π(b, C, Y ) be the take-up probability. The main problem with the IV approach is that
even for an exogenous instrument Z, owing to the nonlinearity of the benefit function b(., .). This in turn implies that the IV moment condition
]Z = 0 is violated and simple IV is inconsistent.
Participation behaviour
The participation decision is represented by a binary probit mechanism:
where: R is an indicator of IS receipt; W = P + N; P is state pension income; N is non-assessable income; r is the expected rate of return on assets; Z is a vector of explanatory variables; and B is the amount of IS actually received. Observed benefit receipt is B = R b(C, Y ). The logarithmic specification of the entitlement effect in (9) fits better than a linear form and has generally been preferred in applied work (see Blundell et. al., 1988; Hernandez et. al., 2006) . We assume that the observed amount of IS benefit received is measured without error. This is not an unduly strong assumption, since the sample was subject to very detailed data cleaning. The rates of IS applicable to pensioners involve fixed amounts, which make it possible to identify many errors and amend them unambiguously (see Hancock and Barker, 2005 , for details). Moreover, pensioners are encouraged by the interviewer to consult appropriate documentary evidence such as an order book or bank statement. Only a small number (under 2%), did not consult documentation when answering the question about benefit receipt.
Our participation analysis is conditional on income and assets, which might be thought endogenous in the sense that people with a distaste for welfare participation may accumulate more pension and other assets in order to reduce IS entitlement, causing a positive bias in the entitlement coefficient. There are two reasons why this simultaneity bias is likely to be small. First, the important decisions governing pension income and asset accumulation (education, occupational choice, marriage, fertility, etc.) are made many years earlier than the decision on participation in the IS system which, in any case, did not exist in its present form until later. Moreover, this cohort of people, mainly from the lower occupational classes had limited choice; their access to the personal finance market was limited and the state pension system offered a flat pension that has turned out to be less generous than most would have expected. These factors militate against a strong simultaneity effect. A second restraining factor is the truncation generated by the IS eligibility criterion. An individual with strong distaste for IS participation who responded by accumulating assets would, once beyond the upper asset threshold have zero IS entitlement and thus make no contribution to bias. Moreover, most evidence suggests that benefit claim costs are constant rather than increasing with the benefit amount (Moffitt, 1983; Hernandez et. al. 2006 ); thus a welfare-averse pensioner would have no incentive to reduce their entitlement rather than eliminate it completely. These effects tend to reduce the magnitude of the residual entitlement-participation correlation among IS-eligible pensioners. With available UK data, there is little prospect of investigating this issue further. An analysis of a model endogenising pension and assets (and potentially, housing and education also) would require longitudinal income-asset data that does not currently exist for the UK. In the absence of such data, our attempts to extend the model to allow correlation between (C, Y ) and the participation residual were unsuccessful and we conclude that the extended model is essentially unidentified.
The underlying income and capital processes
In specifying a model for the 'true' levels of financial assets, C, and private income, Y , we need to allow for the possibility of zero levels for both variables. Let X be the vector of explanatory variables. Define four regimes and their associated conditional probabilities: P 00 (X) = Pr(C = 0, Y = 0|X), P +0 (X) = Pr(C > 0, Y = 0|X), P 0+ (X) = Pr(C = 0, Y > 0|X) and P ++ (X) = Pr(C > 0, Y > 0|X). We specify these as a multinomial logit structure:
Xα 00
e Xα 00 + e Xα +0 + e Xα 0+ + e Xα ++ (10) with analogous expressions for P 0+ ...P ++ . We normalise α 00 = 0. Let g c|0 (C|X) , g y|0 (Y |X) and g cy (C, Y |X) be the three regime-specific densities of (C|C > 0, Y = 0, X), (Y |Y > 0, C = 0, X) and (C, Y |Y > 0, C > 0, X) respectively. We specify these as the following lognormal forms:
where φ(.) is the N(0,1) density and φ(., .; ρ) is the bivariate standard normal density with correlation ρ.
The observation process
We assume that IS receipts, B, are accurately observed for recipients. Regular basic state pension income P and non-assessable income N (mainly non-meanstested disability benefits) are also assumed accurate. These assumptions reflect the generally-accepted belief that the FRS is much more accurate in its recording of state benefits than of private income and assets. The transfer payments P and N are mainly paid in standard amounts and our data checking processes are expected to be highly effective in eliminating recording errors. We assume that the only sources of measurement error are in the private income and asset variables Y and C. Following Duclos, we could make a distinction between the value (Y a , C a ) reported to FRS interviewers and the value (Y g , C g ) reported to IS administrators. Since actual IS assessments are based on the latter, we treat these as "quasi-true" values and refer to the difference (Y a −Y g , C a −C g ) as "measurement error". Henceforth, we drop the g-subscript from (Y g , C g ) and write the composite measurement error ε a − ε g as ε. We assume the measurement error and quasitrue vales are independent, 3 and specify all measurement errors as multiplicative lognormal variates.
There is a single survey response, Y * , on non-pension income and up to three indicators of capital holdings. Write the respondent's initial estimate of total assets as C * 1 ; this is observed only as an interval, A = (A 1 , A 2 ), containing C * 1 . Depending on this first-round response, there may be a second-round point estimate (built up from separate constituent balances), reported as C * 2 . Thirdly, each respondent reports annual investment income, V * . In logarithmic form, we assume:
where: µ(C, Y ) is the vector ln(C, C, rC, Y ); r is the mean rate of return on assets;
and Ω = {ω ij } is a positive definite covariance matrix. 4 In addition to C * The probability structure for observed capital, investment income and nonpension income, conditional on C, Y is:
where
The conditional variance of the first stage capital estimate is
2 ω 12 , s 2 is the vector containing the observable elements of (C * 2 , V * , Y * ), the Jacobian term J is the product of the elements of s 2 , and φ (.; µ 2 , Ω 2 ) is the joint pdf of the N(µ 2 , Ω 2 ) distribution. Asset questions are often not answered and we assume this non-response is ignorable. If there is no first-stage response to the capital questions, the term in square brackets is deleted from (15) and C * 2 then does not appear in s 2 and J. If any of the capital and income estimates is zero, the relevant components of the distribution (15) become degenerate and (15) is modified accordingly.
Identification and MLME estimation
There have been no controlled experiments or natural experiments that can identify the impact of entitlement and income on the participation probability. Instead, we use a priori structure to give parameter identification. Identification is a serious issue for welfare participation modelling but there has been little explicit consideration of it in the applied literature. First, note that, under the error specification reporting to administrators (var(ε g ) = 0) or that the variance term is offset by some combination of positive covariance between the two types of reporting error (cov(ε a , ε g ) > 0) and strategic under-reporting of high income (cov(ε g , Y ) < 0). If there is error in reporting of income and assets to IS administrators, these offsetting covariances are also likely to exist. 4 This formulation of the measurement process implies: (i) if measured capital is zero, then measured investment income is also zero; and (ii) if measured capital is positive, then measured investment income is positive. The former holds exactly in the sample, whilst the latter is violated for very few cases. Inspection of individual records suggests that the latter are really missing, rather than zero, investment income figures. We have dealt with this by recoding them as missing. (14), we can determine from the capital and income responses which of the regimes (10)- (13) is operative. The four probabilities P 00 (X)...P ++ (X) are thus nonparametrically identifiable. The terms Xβ j in (11)- (13) are identified from the empirical distributions of measured capital and income variables, since they are conditional means of log income and assets and the measurement errors are additive in log terms. The linearity of Xβ j is inessential. Write the participation model (9) as Π (Z, b, W + Y + rC) and consider the take-up probability for groups of individuals classified by asset-income regime:
where b(C, Y, P, Z) is the benefit entitlement rule (6) . Note that the vector Z enters b(.) through its influence on the guaranteed amount M. Equation (16) shows that the whole function Π(.) is identified nonparametrically from the subpopulation with C = Y = 0, using a nonparametric regression of R on Z, b(0, 0, P, Z) and W , provided there is enough independent variation in Z, P and N within this subpopulation for the arguments of Π to range independently over the whole space {Z, b : b ∈ (0, M(Z)]} × R + 1 . With Π(.) known and adequate independent variation in Z, P and N, the mixing distributions g c|0 , g y|0 and g c,y can then be recovered nonparametrically from (17)-(19), subject to a mean or median normalisation. Finally, the measurement error distribution f (.) can be identified from the conditional data distribution by virtue of the variation in X:
This structure is over-identified since the reduced-form distributions which give identifying information are defined on higher-dimensional spaces than the structural distributions of (R|Z, b, W ), (C, Y |X) and (C * 1 , C * 2 , V * , Y * |C, Y ). Thus, even with inadequate independent variation to identify Π(.) fully from the C = Y = 0 subpopulation, identification may still be achievable from other parts of the structure. In practice, secure identification requires sufficient exogenous variation to determine the structural parameters with acceptable precision. We will be content, provided the Hessian matrix of the maximised log-likelihood function is clearly invertible and confidence intervals reasonably narrow. The log-likelihood for n observations is:
The distribution g(B, C * 1 , C * 2 , V * , Y * |X) is complicated by the nonlinearity of the benefit rules and requires 2-dimensional integration, evaluated by quadrature. A derivation of g(B, C * 1 , C * 2 , V * , Y * |X) is given in Appendix 2.
6 Estimates Table 1 gives four alternative estimates of the participation component of a simple illustrative model. The first three are standard probit estimates, computed from alternative samples of individuals simulated to be entitled to IS, ignoring measurement error in income and assets. These three samples differ in the measure of entitlement used. Sample 1 (the smallest of the three due to missing values in income and assets) uses simulated entitlements calculated using the survey measures of income and assets. Samples 2 and 3 are intended to reduce the impact of measurement errors and missing values by using survey information on actual benefit receipt rather than simulated entitlement: sample 2 whenever available and sample 3 only when the respondent has consulted documentation to support their response. The final column of Table 1 gives MLME estimates, which are given fully in Tables 2-4 . The choice of explanatory covariates is based on our earlier study (Hernandez et. al., 2006) . They represent household structure, education, housing tenure, disability, income and log entitlement. Other factors such as age, location and greater detail on household structure were found to be insignificant. Households consisting of a single female have a significantly raised probability of participation in IS, while education and home ownership are associated with a significantly reduced claim probability.
Log entitlement and original income have a highly significant positive and negative impact respectively.
The estimated measurement error variances are high. However, it is difficult to distinguish reliably the variances of the underlying random components of income and assets (b σ 
where ε is a N(0, 1) random error and
Since participation occurs whenever the amount of entitlement b(C, Y ) exceeds Γ, the latter is interpretable as the compensating variation -the cash equivalent of the social stigma, application costs or information search costs that are responsible for non-participation. These claim costs represent a welfare loss borne by welfare participants and it is possible to adjust income for claimants by subtracting Γ from observed income. Write Π(b) as the relationship between the participation probability and entitlement, for given values of Z and
and, integrating by parts: Table 3 suggests that the effect of neglecting measurement error in estimation is to overstate the magnitude of implied claim costs for participants by 20-35%. Over-estimation is greatest for households with relatively high income and low IS entitlement. After taking account of measurement errors in estimation, claim costs for these illustrative households are 11-14% of benefit entitlement for home renters and 16-19% for home owners. Although MLME estimation significantly reduces estimated claim costs, they remain large enough to be an important factor in welfare measurement for this group of welfare participants. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a maximum likelihood estimator for a model of welfare participation and applied it to a model of pensioner participation in the British
Income Support using Family Resources Survey data for the tax years 1997-2000.
The model incorporates the relationship between the amount of entitlement and the household's level of income and financial assets. The ML estimator allows for measurement error in the survey respondent's estimates of both income and capital assets, and corrects a technical error in the influential study by Duclos (1995) .
Measurement errors are particularly important in participation models since they contaminate the simulated level of welfare entitlement and distort the selection of welfare-entitled households for conventional participation modelling. The estimates presented here should only be seen as illustrative but they do make the point that results are sensitive to the treatment of measurement error. Making allowance for measurement error has a large effect on our estimate of the impact of the extent of entitlement on the propensity to claim. We have used these estimates to calculate implicit claim costs through an application of the compensating variation principle, and found them to be significantly smaller than estimates obtained using conventional probit estimates of participation behaviour. Despite this, claim costs still represent an important factor in welfare measurement for welfare participants. (6) and (7) respectively. Note that, for computational purposes, the integral in (26) should be broken into two sub-integrals over (0, M − P ) and (M − P, ∞).
Appendix 1 Additional tables
For cases with zero income and positive capital: 
